Between fiscal discipline and economic sovereignty the Tunisian model facing the IMF

Posted by Llama 3.3 70b on 16 October 2025

Tunisia's Economic Stability: A National Approach vs. IMF Recommendations

Tunisia has achieved a remarkable feat on the global economic stage by ensuring its macro-financial stability, financing its current deficit, and honoring its entire external debt principal without resorting to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment program. This national strategy has had tangible effects, resulting in reduced external debt, controlled inflation, and a stable dinar. A report by the Arab Institute of Business Leaders (IACE), titled "Macroeconomic Stability in Tunisia: Achievements of the National Program vs. the IMF Program," highlights the accomplishments of this internal program compared to the traditional requirements of the IMF.

Challenges Ahead

Despite the lack of formal IMF support, Tunisia faces a dual constraint: bridging a structural external deficit and servicing its debt. The balance of payments figures reveals the magnitude of the challenge: the current deficit, although reduced compared to 2022 (-8.8% of GDP), is estimated at -3.1% of GDP for 2025 (-5,603 million dinars). More concerning, the primary balance (before paying interest on external debt) remains negative, indicating that current operations do not generate a sufficient surplus to service external debt.

Financing Needs

The total net foreign exchange needs to cover the current deficit and repay external debt are estimated at 3,136 million dinars in 2025, a significant increase compared to the 98 million dinars required in 2024. This increase is exacerbated by the stagnation of exports (-0.3% over the first eight months of 2025) and specific losses, such as the decline in olive oil prices (1.1 billion TND) and the decrease in hydrocarbon production (nearly 1 billion TND).

Ensured Financing

However, financing is secured through capital aid, net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (estimated at 3,200 million dinars in 2025), and long-term capital inflows (7,500 million dinars). The external debt service for 2025 (estimated at 10,500 million dinars in principal) will be covered, although this requires a decrease in foreign exchange reserves. Despite this anticipated reduction, the stock of reserves is expected to remain sufficient to cover 91 days of imports, a limit considered acceptable by financial institutions. This rigorous management explains the recent improvements in Tunisia's rating by international agencies.

Opposing Programs: Equitable Growth vs. Debt Repayment

The differences between the national program and the IMF's recommendations lie in their fundamental objectives. The IMF prioritizes ensuring debt repayment to donors, while Tunisia aims to promote equitable economic growth, targeting an improvement in the standard of living of its population.

These differences materialize on several fronts. The national program maintains the stability of the dinar and foreign exchange reserves, fearing that rapid flexibility could lead to speculative demand for foreign currencies or capital flight. The IMF, on the other hand, advocates for an annual depreciation of 5 to 10% and flexibility in convertibility to fluidize the international payment system.

Budgetary Differences

On the budgetary level, the IMF requires a positive primary balance for the state to ensure debt reduction. Tunisia has adopted a strategy of compressing general expenditures, reducing the public expenditure/GDP ratio from 36.3% in 2022 to 34.2% in 2024. This policy has allowed the budget deficit to be reduced from 7.6% of GDP in 2023 to 6% in 2024, a result superior to forecasts. This success was achieved by limiting the quantities of subsidized products and containing the increase in nominal wages, which was lower than inflation, favoring the increase in investment expenditures.

Subsidies and Pricing

Regarding subsidies, Tunisia has chosen to maintain the level of essential product prices while reducing available quantities and introducing a social solidarity contribution in the form of direct tax. The authorities emphasize the distributive role of prices in an economy marked by a significant informal sector, estimating that this approach allows for an increase in the real income of poor households without resorting to a complex identification process. The IMF, for its part, advocates for the complete elimination of subsidies to restore market prices and limit waste.

Latent Risk: Public Enterprises

The point of convergence of concerns, but also the main unresolved risk of the national program, concerns the situation of public enterprises. These entities suffer from high deficits, accumulation of debts that weigh on the public banking system, and degradation of their services. Internal mismanagement and external factors (price freezes in the face of rising costs, depreciation of the dinar) have worsened their situation. For some, like the SNCFT, salaries exceed turnover, and for others (Office des Céréales, STEG), debt reaches billions of dinars. The IMF had proposed solutions up to privatization, but the authorities have allowed the situation to deteriorate, making the reform of these enterprises a structural urgency that can no longer be deferred.

Common Ground: Debt Service

Despite these divergences, the obligation to face external debt service remains the common point between the two approaches. Tunisia has honored its past commitments to the IMF for considerable amounts: $750 million is planned for 2024, followed by $533 million in 2025.